Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, BANK OF AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, K MART CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, and NEW ALBERTSON\u27S INC., an Ohio corporation : Brief of Plaintiff/Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA WEST
POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation, BANK OF
AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, K MART
CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, and
NEW ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation
: Brief of Plaintiff/Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nancy L. Kemp; Barbara H. Ochoa; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner.
Kenneth A. Okazaki; Bruce Wycoff; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & Mcdonough, PC; Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent FPA West Point, LLC.
Perrin R. Love; Shannon Zollinger; Clyde, Snow & Sessions; Attorneys for Defendant/ Respondent
Kmart Corporation; Steven E. Tyler; James L. Barnett; Holland & Hart LLP; Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent Bank of America, NA.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA West Point, LLC, No. 20110354 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2859
Case No. 20110354 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, 
BANK OF AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, K MART CORPORATION, 
a Michigan corporation, and NEW ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Presiding 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
NANCY L. KEMP (5498) 
BARBARA H. OCHOA (4102) 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI (3844) 160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
BRUCE WYCOFF (4448) P. O. Box 140858 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, PC Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 Telephone: 801-366-0533 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
Telephone: 801-521-3200 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
FPA West Point, LLC 
(Additional counsel listed on next page) 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT! 
CCD 9 1 onii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20110354 
i • M I 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA 11<)N, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
FPAWEM POIM.I J .C a I )elavvare limited liability company, 
1 iKS I' AMfiRICAN TITl L INSURANCE COMPANY, a : •aiifomiacorpoiation, 
i', \NK 01' AMERICA NA, fka LaSalle Bank,KMART CORPORA! i( >N. 
• Michigan corporation, and NEW AI BERTSON'c IN' u ' >hio corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Presiding 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/PETITK )NE 
KENNETH A. UkA/AK: . 
•.KUCEWYCOFF(4448. 
Jones, Waldo, Hoi brook & McDonough, 
17(i South Main Street, Suite f "• " 
:?kc Cily. ' M;.;: 84101 
Telephone: 801-521-3200 
Attorneys for Defendant/Pospondent 
FPA West Point. : M' 
N/ \ ( > E. KEMP (5 
BARBARA II OCHOA (410?N 
Assistant Utah Attorneys Gem ;.ii 
MARK I . SHURTLEEF(46<«>,> 
• Attorney General 
•iasi 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140858 
>a!> i akc City, Utah 84114-( 
Telephone: 801-366-0533 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
(Additional counsel listed on next p^b~j 
O" A T. \RGTTMFNT REQUESTED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PERRIN R. LOVE (5505) 
SHANNON ZOLLINGER (12724) 
Clyde, Snow & Sessions 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Kmart Corporation 
STEVEN E. TYLER (3301) 
JAMES L. BARNETT (7462) 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801-799-5800 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Bank of America, NA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 3 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTES DO NOT REQUIRE 
COMPENSATION EXCEEDING THE CONDEMNED PROPERTY'S 
VALUE IN GROSS ., 5 
II. BROJVNSETS OUT THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR 
CALCULATING CONDEMNATION DAMAGES 9 
CONCLUSION 12 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 13 
ADDENDA: 
Addendum A: Order on Motion of Codefendant, FPA West Point, to Separate Just 
Compensation Determinations 
Addendum B: Memorandum Decision 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
ABCO Enters, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
2009 UT 36, 211 P.3d 382 2 
A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 
948 P.2d 771 (Utah 1997) 7 
Faux v. Mickelsen, 
725 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1986) 5 
Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Holladay City, 
2008 UT App 301,192 P.3d 302 8 
Miller v. Weaver, 
2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592 5 
State v. Hunt, 
906P.2d311 (Utah 1985) 7 
State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997) 2 
State Road Comm'n v. Brown, 
531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975) 3-4, 7, 9, 11-12 
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 
82 Utah 159,22 P.2d 343 (Utah 1933) 4,10-12 
Utah Cnty. v. Orem City, 
699 P.2d707 (Utah 1985) , 8 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Comp. Laws of Utah § 7340 (1917) 4 
Rev. Stats, of Utah § 104-61-11 4 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (Allen Smith Co. 1953) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 (West 2009) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501 (West 2009) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504 (West 2009) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505 (West 2009) 6, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507 (West 2009) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-510 (West 2009) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West 2009) 2-4, 6-10,12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-522 (West 2009) 6 
PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS 
Plaintiff/petitioner is aware of no prior or related appeals in this case. 
i i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20110354 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, 
BANK OF AMERICA, NA, flea LaSalle Bank, K MART CORPORATION, 
a Michigan corporation, and NEW ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In this condemnation action, plaintiff/petitioner, the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT), seeks review of the Third District Court's April 7,2011 Order on 
Motion of Codefendant, FPA West Point, to Separate Just Compensation Determinations. 
R. 200-01 (Add. A). In its Memorandum Decision, R. 193-97 (Add. B), the court 
concluded that each interest holder in condemned property is entitled to have its interest 
valued separately instead of as a proportion of the property's total value. On June 27, 
2011, this Court granted UDOTs April 27, 2011 Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order. Utah Code Ann. section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009) gives the 
Court jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from "orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction^]" 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that 
Utah's condemnation statutes and the precedents construing them require UDOT to 
separately value each interest in condemned property without reference to the property's 
value as a whole, or "in gross." 
Standards of Review: This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for 
correctness. ABCO Enters, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT 36, f 7,211 P.3d 382. 
"A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which we 
review for correctness." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative: 
§ 78B-6-511 [West 2009]. Compensation and damages-How assessed 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess: 
(l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all 
improvements pertaining to the realty; 
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the 
property; and 
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and 
of each estate or interest in each shall be separately assessedf.] 
The body of this brief contains all other relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
UDOT filed its Complaint in Eminent Domain on April 29,2010, seeking to 
condemn an access point on property owned by FPA West Point (FPA) and in which 
FPAfs codefendants each claim an interest, k. 1-14. It then moved for an order of 
occupancy under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-510 (West 2009). R. 15-16 (motion), 17-27 
(memorandum). After the district court granted the motion, R. 132-35, FPA moved the 
court to determine its compensation separately from its codefendants. R. 143-45 
(motion), 149-57 (memorandum). On January 27,2011, the district court issued its 
Memorandum Decision, ruling that this Court's decision in State Road Commission v. 
Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975), conflicts with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-6-511(l)(b) (West 2009). R. 193-97. The district court specifically concluded, 
contrary to Brown, that "the general rule of valuing [condemned property] fin gross* is 
inapplicable in Utah[,]" R. 195, and entered an order granting FPA's motion on April 7, 
2011. R. 200-01. UDOT then filed its petition for permission to take an interlocutory 
appeal from that order, which this Court granted on June 27, 2011. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The only relevant facts in addition to those stated above are 
appraisal of the condemned property valued it "as a whole and did not attempt to value 
3 
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the separate interests in the property[,J" R. 164; and (2) there has been no substantive 
change to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-51 l(l)fs dispositive language since 19.17.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court acknowledged that Brown stands for the principle that 
"condemned property must be valued as a whole" to be apportioned among the interest 
holders. R. 195. Nonetheless, the court treated Brown as a legal aberration, and turned to 
an earlier case, Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (Utah 1933), to 
support the proposition that each interest must be separately valued without reference to 
the property's value in gross. But Town of Perry addressed a different issue: the lump-
sum valuation of multiple, individually-owned parcels. Brown, by contrast, addressed 
valuation of a single parcel in which the owner had granted a leasehold interest-the same 
circumstance present here. Brown unequivocally holds that the total value of the interests 
cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole. No subsequent case has cast doubt on 
the continued vitality of that longstanding precedent. 
Nor do the governing statutes require a different result. Even before condemnation 
proceedings begin, the condemning authority must attempt to negotiate a voluntary 
purchase with the property owner. If compensation were due to each interest holder, 
unconstrained by the property's value in gross, these statutorily mandated negotiations 
would be futile, as the owner's agreement to a sales price could not resolve any issues of 
vSee Comp. Laws of Utah § 7340 (1917); Rev. Stats, of Utah Ann. § 104-61-11 
(1933); Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (Allen Smith Co.1953). 
4 
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jmpensation due other interest holders. Once a condemnation action is filed, 
the trial court's obligation, under1 slaltde, i,-. le. <lrfeii!iiiiii \ I'M si, lln value- ol' (lie property -•' 
and its improvements, and, second, the value of each separate interest. As in the 
negotiation process, if the value of the property as a whole did not constrain the 
compensatic 11 :!i i z for those separate interests, there would be no need-let alone a 
statutory requirement-for the trial courl lo assess I 11 I  ( h a ! » o m f ' s o b h g a l i i»i He-
adjudicate the interest holders' competing claims in the compensation proceeds does not 
change the overall value of the property as established by the court in the first instance. 
' • The district coi u t!s 01 der for sepai ate \ aluati :::ai of each interest regardless of the 
property's value in gross conflates the statutory elements of eminent doma ; 





- ^ r ^ r > c > ; r > ^ ^ 
I. THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTES UU NU1 REQUIRE 
COMPENSATION EXCEEDING THE CONDEMNED PROPER! 
VALUE IN GROSS 
"When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's plain language to 
determine llie I ,ctfislaliiiv's nifeiil and pmpow We read the plain language of the-statute 
as a whole, and interpret provisions in harmony.with other statutes in the same : hapte i 
and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation 
appellate courts apply " "the cardinal rule that if the language is 
susceptible-of .two constructions, eiin wlii^h vi • '! ea»" \ v < ami "'lie otliei tleieal sueh 
manifest object, it should receive the former construction.' " Faux v. Mickelsen } 1 S 1 ""< I 
5 
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1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland's Statutory 
Construction § 46.05 (4th ed. 1984)). The trial court's inteipretation of the condemnation 
statutes cannot withstand these principles. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-501 through -522 (West 2009 and Supp. 2011) 
comprehensively regulate Utah's eminent domain proceedings. Under those statutes, a 
condemning entity cannot file a condemnation action until it (1) notifies the property 
owner in writing of each public meeting during which a vote on the proposed taking is 
anticipated, id. § 78B-6-504(2)(c) (West 2009), and (2) makes a reasonable effort to 
negotiate the purchase of the property with the property owner. Id. § 78B-6-505( 1). 
While these statutes explicitly require notice to and negotiation with the property owner, 
they do not contain similar requirements regarding holders of subsidiary interests. By 
contrast, the statute governing the condemnation complaint requires the condemning 
authority to list, as defendants, "the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if 
known, or a statement that they are unknown," id. § 78B-6-507(l)(b) (emphasis added), 
and the statute controlling court proceedings requires the trier of fact to determine "the 
value of each and every separate estate or interest inthe property." Id. 
§ 78B-6-51 l(l)(b) (emphasis added). The latter two provisions demonstrate that where 
the legislature intended to include subsidiary interests in the scope of a statutory 
requirement, it was capable of doing so. 
These statutory requirements are not in conflict, but are readily harmonized. 
Because subsection 51 l(l)(b) tasks the trial court with resolving all conflicting claims to 
6 
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the condemnation proceeds, the court must know the identity of each claimant; therefore, 
(lif irquiinni'iil I Ill ill iiil rlaiini.iiil . in tin i (tiiipliiiiii is <i i;itinn<il iiirans of nssuim^, 
complete resolution. But that task does not mean that each claim is entitled to be 
determined in isolation. Instead, as this Court held in State Road Commission v. Brown, 
"The condemning authority is liable for the value of the land taken and for severance 
damages to the land not taken and it is from., these amounts that the lessee mi istreceh e 
any damages which it may have sustained as a result of the taking." Brown, 531 P.2d at 
1295. In Brown, the Court unequivocally stated, "The total of all interests cannot exceed 
claims is entirely compatible with its duty to determine the overall value from which they 
must be satisfied. 
1 o accept the construction proposed by defendants and embraced by the trial court 
meaning to all provisions in a statute." A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 948 P.2d 771, 
779 (Utah 1997). As the Court has observed, " 'any interpretation which renders parts or 
" 'mils lit i sliiluilr i i i o p e m l i w nn s i i pn flnnus il In he in nnlrrl Vi i / i ' i ' Hum "NlhP M 
311,312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 
1987)). If the value of the property as a whole served no limiting function, there would 
be no need to determine it. I he trial courtfs construction renders this statutory duty 
moprmlivp o\ supniliKHis H'.l (IK1 SIMIIIIC icqiiires tlur lindn <»! l;n I In "rlcloriTimc <iihl 
assess: (l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
7 
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pertaining to the realty[.]M Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West 2009). The trial court's 
construction also renders subsection (l)(c) superfluous. Subsection (l)(c) requires that 
where separate parcels are being condemned, "the value of each parcel and of each estate 
or interest in each shall be separately assessed[.]" Id. § 78B-6-511(l)(c). If each estate or 
interest were entitled to be valued without reference to the gross value of the parcel 
giving rise to it, there would be no need to separately value each underlying parcel. 
Moreover, "the law does not require litig^ 
Towne Ctr.9LLC v. Holladay 0 ^ , 2 0 0 8 UTApp 301,^6, 192 P.3d 302 (internal f 
quotation marks and citation omitted). If the condemned property's value in gross did not 
serve as a cap, then requiring the condemnor to negotiate a purchase price with the 
property owner alone-as section 78B-6-505 requires-would be a futile act; holders of 
i 
subsidiary interests would still have potential unsatisfied claims against the condemnor 
that could thwart a negotiated purchase. This result would not only render the negotiation 
process futile, but would rob the owner of its right to alienate the property, ceding control 
to non-ownership interests the owner may have every right to extinguish-albeit at a cost. 
"If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of the legislature or of
 ( 
persons affected by [a] statute would be influenced by another statute, then those statutes 
should be construed in pari materia, construed with reference to one another and 
4 
harmonized if possible." Utah Cnty,^ 
the eminent domain statutes work together to provide a legal framework for public 
entities to obtain property for the construction of public works at fair market value by < 
8 
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appropriately compensating the property's owner or owners. I he trial court's strained 
I niiMlli in (ion i annul IK1 sustain*1*! v illllii ml niidi i" i i i |» fsiil" ul the itafiifes inopn t in t1 or 
futile. The rules of statutory construction consistently applied by Utah's appellate courts 
do not permit this result. 
I lie trial court erred by failing to consider secti<» . .. • ..!,i ^ . let aione as part 
nl a llaign statutory s< l ienr I 'ovnnuir n w n n i l domain .in hoih R\ fo* nsinj?, MIII ly on 
section 78B-6-51 l(l)(b)'s requirement to determine the value of each separate interest, it 
effectively made subsections (l)(a) and (l)(c) mere surplusage and failed to interpret the 
s< • ; • • - " . '
 r ' h » . n * L »r 
these reasons, the court's order warrants reversal. 
~ BROWN SETS OUT THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR 
CALCULATING CONDEMNATION DAMAGES 
xi distinction of State i?< - • .; * ;o 
constitutes error. But this Court's decision in Brown sets out the correct standard for 
calculating condemnation damages. Brown supports reversal here. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court first concluded that I Jtah Code Ann. 
: • -: =•- t . 
t *>?. It then held that Brown conflicts with the statute's plain language, stating that 
"Brown must be explained as simply opting to follow a valuation approach that is 
jgislature, namely the \ raluation of eacl i inter est 
separately, iv. I > J . iiic court reasoned that "if the Coi n I: w ere to folio w Brown It 
9 
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would violate the cardinal rule of rendering a statute effectively null." R.195. But the 
court considered only subsection 51 l(l)(b), and made no attempt to reconcile it with the 
language of subsections (l)(a) and (l)(c). Nor did the court look at the eminent domain 
statutes as a whole. Consequently-as shown in Point I, above-the court's construction of 
the statute failed to give effect to the intent and purpose of the statutory scheme. 
To support its interpretation, the trial court turned to this Court's decision in Town 
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (Utah 1933). To the trial court, Town of 
Perry "confirmed that the general rule of valuing fin gross1 is inapplicable in Utah.11 
R. 195. A careful reading of Town of Perry belies that interpretation. 
Town of Perry involved the condemnation of land from adjoining parcels under 
different ownership. Neither the complaint nor the evidence showed how much land was 
taken from each owner. Id. at 346. Setting aside the judgment and remanding the case 
for a new trial, this Court observed that "[t]he statute required, and the authorities sustain 
the view, that the parcels of land in separate ownership should be described in the 
complaint or by amendment thereto before the court can submit the question of damages 
to the jury." Id. (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that "[e]ach of the owners is 
entitled to have the land taken from his tract separately assessed." Id. (emphasis added). 
To reach that decision, the Court cited to statutory language substantively similar to the 
present section 511(1 )(a) and (l)(c): " The court, jury, commissioners, or referee * * * 
must ascertain and assess: 1. The value of the property sought to be condemned; * * * if 
it consist of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or interest 
10 
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therein shall be separately assessed.1 ,f Id. at 347 (quoting Comp. Laws Utah 1915, 
1
 1\ III) What /IIIIN o/ \\TV\ lorhids is (In: collrrtnr \ ihialhin nl \m\\\ nliml p*ii'rcls 
under separate ownership, not the valuation in gross of a single parcel encompassing 
multiple non-ownership interests. The Court's citation of the statute's requirement to 
separately determine the value of each different parcel" "and of each estate or interest 
IIKMI'IM11 miikc lln |loinf lln i illin ml! .iibsiikitv mtnvsls r, ^ibsiiiiinl mil lln \ iillnn nl 
theparcel that supports them. Id. 
Brown is consistent with both the statutes and Town of Perry. In Brown, the state 
sought to condemn ; .* < • . . . n; 
L moration for the operation of a /-.eleven store. In examining the damages due to 
Southland, the Court began by recounting the principle underlying Utah's eminent domain 
proceedings: f,[t]he condemning authority is liable for the value of the land taken and for 
receive any damages which it may have sustained as a result of the taking." Brown, 531 
P.2d at 1295. In any case, "[t]he total of all interests cannot exceed the ^ aim r ' V 
property .. applying this-principle, tl le Coi ii t conch ided that Southland .,>, 
Corporation was not entitled to damages over and above the value of the land in gross. 
As the Court explained, "[s]o far as the condemning authority is concerned, the agreement 
between the tenant and landlord is not important." Id at 1296 Because the condemnor 
lake-, tin1 iiitntMl nl hnlh it ilm mil m.tlli i In ml wlm Ii nl lln IM- ih mi pailuis In i illllii l i r l l r i 
bargain." Id. This rule does not excuse the court from its statutorily-prescribed role to 
M 
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determine, within the property's value, the allocation of condemnation proceeds between 
the owner and the non-owner interest holders, as required by section 51 l(l)(b). It simply 
recognizes that once the value of the property as a whole is established, the condemning 
authority has no liability for additional amounts, and that the subsidiary interest holders 
must look, for their recovery, to the condemnation proceeds as allocated by the court. 
This analysis takes nothing away from the determination in Town of Perry that parcels 
under separate ownership must be separately assessed, but applies the holding of that case 
in harmony with the precise requirements of section 511" in its entirety and with the 
eminent domain statutes as a whole. 
The trial court misconstrued Town of Perry to require valuation of each interest in 
condemned property without reference to the property's value as a whole, contrary to 
Brown. But, asscrutiny-establishes and Brown confirms, Town of Perry never required 
that result. Consequently, Brown requires reversal of the trial court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, as fully explained above, the Utah Department of Transportation 
respectfully moves the Court to reverse the trial court's order granting the motion of FPA 
West Point for a separate just compensation determination. 
12 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
involving non-ownership interests, UDOT requests oral argument to resolve this 
important issue. 
v 1 ED this Ui^r day of September, 
Nancy I , Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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Attorneys for Co-Defendant, FPA West Point, LLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE 
STATE OFUTAH 




FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California 
corporation, BANK OF AMERICA, NA, fka 
LaSalle Bank, NA, K MART 
CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, and 
NEW ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION OF CO-
DEFENDANT, FPA WEST POINT, TO 
SEPARATE JUST COMPENSATION 
DETERMINATIONS 
Case No. 100907779 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
On November 29, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the motion of Co-Defendant, FPA 
West Point, LLC ("FPA") to Separate Just Compensation Determinations (the "Motion"). FPA 
appeared through its counsel of record, Bruce WycofF of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), appeared through the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Barbara H. Ochoa and John M. Zidow. Co-Defendant, Kmart Corporation 
Error! Unknown document property name. 
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("Kmart"), appeared through its counsel of record, Perrin R. Love of Clyde Snow & Sessions, but did 
not take a position on the Motion or present argument at the hearing. 
After carefully reviewing the pleadings filed by FPA and UDOT, considering the arguments 
of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for the reasons set forth in the Court's January 27, 2011 
Memorandum Decision, FPA's Motion is GRANTED. 




APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
By / f e W W'Uit*^ 
Barbara H. Ochoa, 
Attorneys for Utah Department of 
Transportation 
Error! Unknown document property name. 2 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 7 2011 
.^WlXLAKB COUNTY 
cZ2^ Deputy Clerk 
I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : / CASE NO. 100907779 
vs. : 
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware : 
Limited Liability Company; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
a California Corporation; BANK OF 
AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, NA; : 
K MART CORPORATION, a Michigan 
Corporation; and NEW ALBERTSON'S : 
INC., an Ohio Corporation, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on November 29, 
2010, in connection with the Motion of Co-Defendant, FPA West Point, to 
Separate Just Compensation Determinations. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider 
the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal authority and 
counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This action began with the plaintiff Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") filing a Complaint in Eminent Domain seeking to 
condemn an access point on property owned by defendant FPA West Point 
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(«FPA"j . According to UDOT's Complaint, defendant KMart Corporation 
("KMart"), which is a tenant of FPA, "claims an interest in the Subject 
Property" pursuant to its lease agreement with FPA. 
FPA's Motion seeks to separate the determination of just 
compensation in this case by valuing its interest separate from that of 
Kmart's interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78B-6-511. Specifically, 
§ 78B-6-511 (1)(b) directs that the assessment of compensation and damages 
in a condemnation be based on the "value of each and every separate 
estate or interest in the property . . ." 
UDOT, in its Opposition, suggests that the applicable law is found 
not in § 78B-6-511(l)(b), but rather in State Road Comm'n v. Brown, 531 
P.2d 1294, 1295 (Utah 1975). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the ''condemning authority is liable for the value of the land taken 
and for severance damages to the land not taken, and it is from these 
amounts that the lessee must receive any damages which it may have 
sustained as a result of the taking." UDOT argues that FPA's Motion 
fails under Brown and leads to the conclusion that FPA's property must 
be valued as a whole, with each interest holder later assessing the 
amount of that total figure which it is entitled to. 
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal positions, 
the Court determines that the plain language of § 78B-6-511(1)(b) must 
be honored and that FPA be granted the opportunity to have its interests 
valued separately from other interests in the subject property. 
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Specifically, the language of §"78B-6-511(1) (b) is clear and unambiguous 
and must therefore be regarded as conclusive. The Court recognizes that 
the Brown decision conflicts with § 78B-6-511(1)(b) in holding that the 
condemned property must be valued as a whole, leaving the apportionment 
of that value to be determined amongst the respective interest holders. 
To the extent that it is reasonably practical, Brown must be explained 
as simply opting to follow a valuation approach that is contrary to the 
one selected by the Utah Legislature, namely the valuation of each 
interest separately. Further, not'only does Brown conflict with § 78B-
6-511(1) (b), but it also conflicts with the earlier Utah Supreme Court 
decision in Perry v. Thomas, 22 P.2d 343 (Utah 1933), which invoked the 
predecessor statute to § 78B-6-511(l) (b) and confirmed that the general 
rule of valuing "in gross" is inapplicable in Utah. In the face of the 
unambiguous language in § 78B-6-511(l) (b) and the Thomas decision, Brown 
stands out as the lone legal authority in Utah persistently applying the 
general valuation approach in a state which has clearly chosen to opt out 
of that approach. 
Ultimately, if the Court were to follow Brown, it would violate the 
cardinal rule of rendering a statute effectively null. Therefore, to 
avoid such a result and in effort to reconcile the conflicting 
authorities, the Court applies § 78B-6-511 (1) (b) and Thomas, the decision 
of the Utah Supreme Court which most directly addresses the legislatively 
chosen valuation approach. Under these specific authorities, the Court 
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grants FPA's Motion and orders separate determinations of the just 
compensation due to FPA and to Kmart for injury to their respective 
interests in the subject property. 
Counsel for FPA is to prepare an Order consistent with this 
Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for review and 
signature. 
Dated this _day of January,S2011. 
/f1v6^ £ y 
TYRONFjE. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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P.O. Box 140857 
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